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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
years the force and logic of their arguments have received
increasing recognition, possibly because of the change in present-
day attitude towards the matrimonial relation.39 There has been
a slow but definite trend throughout the common law jurisdic-
tions towards the abolition of the privilege altogether.4° The
Legislature, in drafting Act 157 of 1916, did not clearly indicate
the extent to which it intended the policy behind the privilege
to be carried out.41 Therefore, in cases presenting aspects of the
privilege not covered specifically by the statute, the court has
been obliged to rely largely on its own discretion as to whether
the protection afforded by the privilege should be limited or
extended. It is submitted that the position taken by the court
is completely justified.
Sidney B. Galloway
MINERAL RIGHTS-DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO DiuL--
LEASE INTERPRETATION
Plaintiff, lessor, sought damages from defendant, lessee, for
alleged breach of contract to drill on her land. A rider attached
to a form lease provided:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions contained herein it is
understood and agreed that this lease shall be forfeited and
rendered null and void unless on or before sixty days from
the date lessee commences the actual drilling of a well at
some point within one mile of the above described property
and prosecutes such drilling with due diligence to a depth
of 3,300 feet unless oil or gas is discovered in paying quanti-
ties at a lesser depth, and if said well is completed as well
capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, then, in
the event, lessee shall commence the actual drilling of a
39. Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Family Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929).
40. Report by the American Bar Association's Committee on the Improve-
ment of the Law of Evidence as quoted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d
ed. 1940): "The privilege has been abolished in only a few States; but a
tendency to extend the abolition has recently been apparent, not only in civil
litigation but in criminal prosecutions. . . . It is recommended that the
privilege protecting from being called one against the other be abolished
(1) in civil cases, and (2) in criminal cases."
41. Statutes which include a specific provision protecting the accused
from adverse inference created by the exercise of the husband-wife privilege
are by no means rare. For a full list of such enactments, see 3 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).
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well on some part of the land covered by this lease within
90 days after the completion of said first well and drill the
same with due diligence to at least the depth where the
oil or gas is found in paying quantities in the said first well.
A well capable of producing 25 barrels of oil in 24 hours shall
be considered as capable of producing in paying quantities."
(Italics supplied.)
The lessee drilled a "producing well" outside the leased premises,
but did not begin drilling a well on plaintiff's premises within
ninety days after completion of the first well. Plaintiff contended
that by the terms of the rider defendant became unconditionally
obligated to drill on her land when the producing well was
drilled adjacent to her premises. Held, defendant was not un-
conditionally obligated to drill on plaintiff's land, hence, plain-
tiff was not entitled to damages. Failure to drill merely ter-
minated the lease. Godfrey v. Lowery, 223 La. 163, 65 So.2d 124
(1953).
The lease without the rider in the instant case' provided that
the lease would terminate at the end of a stated time unless the
lessee drilled a well or paid delay rental, but did not bind the
lessee either to drill or to pay. This type is sometimes designated
as an "option" lease. A lease with similar provisions is often
designated in other jurisdictions as the "unless" type lease.2
The absence of a duty upon the lessee in the so-called
"option" type lease does not, however, render it null as containing
a potestative condition since the cash consideration, usually con-
sidered as a bonus, supports the lease for the primary term
specified in the contract.3 Since the lessee is not bound to con-
tinue the lease beyond the initial term, the extension, or renewal
is therefore in the nature of an option.
4
The option lease has been subject to strict construction by
the courts, and if the lessee has not exercised his "option" to
extend the lease, by either drilling or paying delay rental, the
lease automatically terminates.5 There is no necessity for the
1. This type of lease was first approved in Saunders v. Busch-Everett Co.,
138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1916). See Comment, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 80 (1941).
See also Daggett, Louisiana Mineral Rights 181 (1945).
2. Joyce v. Wyant, 202 F.2d 863, 864 (6th Cir. 1953); LeRosen v. North
Central Texas Oil Co., 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Ibid.
5. Talley v. Lawhorn, 150 La. 251, 90 So. 427 (1922); Smith v. Sun Oil Co.,
172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931); Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., Inc., 189 La. 645, 180 So.
473 (1938).
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lessor to put the lessee in default, since the lease is said to ter-
minate by its own terms.6
Since the decision finds its basis in the interpretation of the
lease, and more particularly in the interpretation of the quoted
rider, brief mention of basic canons of construction should prove
helpful.
When the terms of the instrument are free from ambiguity,
and the intent of the parties is clear, the courts are bound to
give effect to the contract as written.7 If the written instrument
does not clearly express the intent of the parties, but the parties
themselves have executed the contract in a certain manner, or
where one of the parties executed it and the other expressly or
impliedly gave his assent, the court will use the construction
placed upon the agreement by the parties as a rule for its
interpretation.8
It is also a rule of construction that the interpretation of
one part of an instrument shall be made with due regard for the
other parts, reflecting the intention of the act as a whole, so
that one part will not negate other parts of the instrument. It
appears that the court used only the latter rule to determine the
intentions of the parties with respect to the rider attached to the
form lease.
The statement that oil and gas leases are construed strongly
against the lessee has been made frequently by the courts of
many jurisdictions, including Louisiana.10 The Supreme Court
in Hunt Trust v. Crowell Land & Mineral Corporation" however
refused to accept this proposition without reservation. This
refusal is pointed up in cases where damages were sought against
the lessee. If there is ambiguity, the lease is generally construed
against the one who prepares it, and oil and gas leases are usually
prepared by the lessee. i2
6. Ibid.
7. Art. 1945, La. Civil Code of 1870; Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La.
287, 163 So. 103 (1935); Ker v. Evershed, 41 La. Ann. 15, 6 So. 566 (1889).
8. Art. 1956, La. Civil Code of 1870; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178,
62 So. 623 (1913); Pendleton v. McFarlane, 222 La. 569, 63 So.2d 1 (1953).
9. Art. 1955, La. Civil Code of 1870; Knight v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co.,
197 La. 237, 1 So.2d 89 (1941); Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349
(1938); Lozes v. Segura Sugar Co., Ltd., 52 La. Ann. 1844, 28 So. 249 (1900);
Glassell v. Richardson Oil Co., 150 La. 999, 91 So. 431 (1922).
10. Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913). Cf. Murrell v.
Lion, 30 La. Ann. 255 (1878).
11. 210 La. 945, 28 So.2d 669 (1946).
12. Art. 1958, La. Civil Code of 1870; Murrell'v. Lion, 30 La. Ann. 255
(1878).
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In the instant case the rider did not provide for the renewal
of the lease by the payment of delay rental, and it contained the
provision that the lease "shall be forfeited and rendered null and
void unless" certain wells were drilled, which did not obligate
the lessee. The plaintiff was of the opinion that the lessee had
exercised its only option by drilling the well outside the leased
premises, and that failure to drill on the plaintiff's land rendered
the lessee liable to damages similar to those granted in Fite v.
Miller.'s
That case presented a similar factual situation. The lessee
had entered into a contract with the lessor to drill a well on land
owned by the former which joined that of the latter, and upon
completion of that well to commence a second well within ten
days on the leased premises which were owned by the parties
jointly. The court awarded damages equal to the amount it would
have cost to drill the well.
In a later case, Fogle v. Feazel,14 damages were sought by
the lessor because the lessee failed to drill a well on property
outside the leased premises. The court said the lessor did not
have an interest in the well and therefore could not claim
damages. It appears that if, in the instant case, the court had
found that the provision in the nature of an option applied only
to the first well, the lessor would have had the requisite "interest"
since the second well was to be drilled on land owned and leased
by him.
The printed lease form in the instant case would have made
performance by the lessee optional. Under its terms he would not
have been obligated to drill or pay delay rental. The parties at
the instance of the lessor replaced this provision with the rider.
According to the court's interpretation of the meaning of the
rider, the lessor merely eliminated one means by which the
lease could be extended or renewed-payment of delay rental-
and provided the lessee with two options to drill instead of one,
the second option to become effective if the lessee exercised the
first one.
The ultimate result of the case seems sound. It appears likely
that the value of lessor's mineral rights, and hence the value of
his land, was enhanced by the producing well within a mile of
his land. On the other hand, it is possible that the well was not
13. 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1940).
14. 201 La. 899, 10 So.2d 695 (1942).
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producing according to the hopes of the lessee, and that it would
not be any more enticing to another lessee than to the defendant.
It would seem that the court intends to restrict the ruling of
Fite v. Miller15 to the particular factual situation there presented.
The court seems to make it clear that the unconditional obliga-
tion, necessary to come within the facts of that case, must be
explicit in the agreement, and that the lease will not be arbi-
trarily construed against the lessee. This is a plausible position.
The costs of drilling have increased considerably since the deci-
sion in the Fite case, and similar damages would be very heavy,
indeed.
Carl F. Walker
MINERAL RIGHTS-EFFECT OF SPACING ORDERS ON SERVITUDE
Holt owned forty acres of land. In 1939 he sold the east half
to A. J. Pitts and the west half to J. C. Pitts, subject to a reser-
vation in himself of the minerals underlying both tracts. In 1944
Holt had granted an oil and gas lease covering the whole forty
and subsequently conveyed undivided interests in his reserved
minerals. In 1945 the Department of Conservation issued an
order setting up a forty acre spacing pattern for the Holt Zone
and May Sand in the Delhi Field of which this tract formed a
part. In 1946 the lessees obtained a permit to drill on the tract
and a well was completed on the west half which has produced
oil in allowable quantities since that time. In 1947 plaintiff Smith
acquired the east half of the forty on which no well had been
drilled. Plaintiff brought suit against Holt and his assignees to
be declared the owner of the minerals on that part of the tract
alleging the extinguishment of the servitude on that part of the
tract by non-user for a period of ten years. Held, that since a
single lessee held the entire tract, he was the "owner" of the
entire tract within the meaning of the Conservation Act. In such
a situation a pooling order could serve no useful purpose, the
effect of a conventional pooling agreement being achieved by
single ownership. Smith v. Holt, 67 So. 2d 93 (La. 1953).
The Louisiana Conservation Act' provides that the Com-
missioner of Conservation may establish drilling units upon
15. 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1940).
1. La. Act 157 of 1940, now La. R.S. 1950, 30:1 et seq.
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